MA XUEJING/CHINA DAILY

　　It has been mistakenly argued that the weakening of Iran following attacks by the United States and Israel is a major strategic setback for China. According to this view, Beijing's long-term engagement with Tehran is a central pillar of its Middle East strategy, and the degradation of Iran's capabilities therefore constrains China's global ambitions.

　　Such interpretations deserve closer scrutiny. Regional developments are not insignificant, but they risk conflating tactical events with structural transformations in the international system. The deeper issue is not whether one partnership has been strained but whether military action can meaningfully shape — or redefine — the trajectory of a global power transition.

　　Over the past two decades, China has expanded its economic engagement across the Middle East through trade, energy cooperation and infrastructure projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative. This engagement has been predominantly commercial. Energy security, maritime connectivity and diversified supply chains are fundamental to China's development model. Stability in the Gulf region is therefore not peripheral to Beijing's interests but structurally embedded in them.

　　To frame China's relationship with Iran primarily as a geopolitical maneuver reflects a securitized reading of international relations. China is the world's largest importer of crude oil. Prolonged instability in the Middle East would increase costs, heighten risks, and undermine the predictability essential to global trade. For an economy deeply integrated into global markets, systemic instability cannot be a strategic asset.